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Reason and emotion are often seen as two distinct mental faculties, with optimal decision-
making assumed to require the protection of cognitive reasoning processes from the intrusion 
of irrational emotions. Accordingly, the media are expected to cover political issues without 
appealing to the emotions of the citizen, in order to support rational opinion formation. 
However, recent research indicates that the media often elicit affective responses in the 
recipients. This article focuses on the question of how such affective responses influence 
recipients’ political opinions. The effects of moods, arousal, and emotions in judgment 
processes are reviewed. Importantly, the article addresses the question as to whether affects, 
which are relevant for a judgment, have the same impact as affects, which are not relevant 
for a judgment. 
 
 
Introduction 
Citizens in a democratic society are, by definition, participants 
in the process of formulating the common rules for their com-
munity. Democratic theory addresses the normative demands 
made of the citizen that ensure the success of the democratic 
process. Among other things, the citizen is assumed to possess a 
certain level of cognitive competence, which enables him or her 
to participate in the political discourse. This competence in-
cludes some basic knowledge about the functioning of the politi-
cal system and current political events as well as the ability to 
make autonomous and reasonable judgments (Berelson 1952; 
Detjen 2000). In this context, emotions are perceived as a hin-
drance to rational decision-making that promotes the develop-
ment of suboptimal solutions. Reason and emotion are often 
seen as two distinct mental faculties, with optimal decision-
making assumed to require the protection of cognitive reasoning 
processes from the intrusion of irrational emotions (Elster 1996; 
Marcus 2002). 
Democratic theory also ascribes to the news media a central 
role in the promotion of political discourse. News media have 
the obligation to help the citizen exercise his or her participation 
rights by disseminating reliable information and presenting the 
relevant points of view on important issues (e.g., Christians et al. 
2009). Furthermore, the media are expected to cover political 
issues without appealing to the emotions of the citizen because 
emotions can undermine a reasonable discourse (e.g., Martinsen 
2009). 
However, content analyses have repeatedly demonstrated 
that political news reporting contains significant emotional ap-
peal. For example, Jerit (2004) observed that, during the Cana-
dian General Election Campaign of 1988, the opponents of a 
free trade agreement with the U.S.A. heavily relied on arguments 
related to anger and fear. Anger appeals consisted of allegations 
that the Canadian Prime Minister was selling out, betraying his 
country, and turning Canada into a U.S. satellite by promoting 
the free trade agreement. Fear appeals cited economic threats of 
the proposal, such as potential job losses. Further studies have 
shown that appeals to emotions including hope or pride are con-
veyed to voters during campaigns (Marmor-Lavie & Weimann 
2005) and that such appeals are often included in politicians’ 
speeches (De Castella, McGarty, & Musgrove 2009), political 
advertisements (Kaid & Johnston 1991), and news reports about 
events, such as 9/11 (Cho et al. 2003). More importantly, such 
semantic depictions of political issues, candidates, and events 
have been shown to evoke emotional reactions in recipients 
(e.g., Gross & Brewer 2007; Nerb & Spada 2001). 
In addition to semantic information, visual and auditory el-
ements as well as formal features of articles and news programs 
may elicit emotional reactions. In an experimental demonstra-
tion by McHugo and colleagues (1985), video clips of Ronald 
Reagan displaying happiness, fear, or anger had a significant 
impact on viewers’ emotional reactions. Furthermore, emotional 
reactions were induced by video clips of emotional facial dis-
plays that had the audio track removed (i.e., with no semantic 
information communicated). Similarly, Bucy (2003) found that, 
in the context of short news segments, the depicted potency of 
President Bush’s behavior influenced viewers’ arousal and their 
experience of sympathy. Thus, visual information about political 
candidates may be an agent of emotion. 
Researchers have also demonstrated a relationship between 
emotional reactions and formal or structural features of audio-
visual media, such as edits, motion, zooms, and sounds (Lang 
1990; Lang et al. 2000; Simmons et al. 1999). According to 
Lang (2000), structural features can augment emotional arousal 
by urging the recipient to assess a novel stimulus configuration 
(e.g., a new setting after a scene change). In other words, the 
higher the pacing and complexity of an audiovisual production, 
the stronger the emotional activation on the part of the recipient. 
Thus, previous research indicates that various aspects of po-
litical news may trigger emotional reactions. This finding has 
important implications for public opinion formation because the 
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media are the most important source of political information for 
the majority of citizens. When learning and forming opinions 
about political issues and candidates, citizens may regularly 
experience emotions with the potential to influence their judg-
ments.  
Furthermore, not only political news but also entertainment 
programs, commercials, and non-political news trigger emotions 
that might influence political judgments. For instance, Wirth, 
Schemer, and Matthes (2010) found that moods induced by 
commercials influenced the evaluation of two political news 
stories that were aired before and after the commercial break. 
This finding implies that the political reasoning process is sus-
ceptible to the influence of emotions, even those that are irrele-
vant to political judgment.  
The numerous sources of emotional triggers in the media 
suggest that the influence of relevant and irrelevant affect on 
political opinion formation may be the rule rather than the ex-
ception. Thus, investigations of media effects on political opin-
ions must take affective responses into account. This article ad-
dresses the ways in which media-induced affect influences polit-
ical opinion formation by reviewing research on the influence of 
affect on judgment. The review not only addresses the attitudinal 
outcomes of affective influences but also considers the mecha-
nisms that produce these effects. In particular, I focus on the 
differential effects of relevant versus irrelevant affect that are of 
particular importance for communication science, given that 
media may induce both types of affect. Because affective influ-
ences have traditionally been disregarded in key theories regard-
ing the effects of mass media (cf. Schenk 2007), empirical find-
ings from communication science and political science fields 
focusing on the influence of affect on opinion are still scarce (cf. 
Marcus, 2002; Nabi 2009; Wirth & Schramm 2005). However, 
psychological research has yielded substantial insight into the 
effects of affective states on attitudes (cf. Blanchette & Richards 
2010) and the underlying processes that produce such affective 
influences. Accordingly, I draw primarily on psychological re-
search to explain how affect influences political opinion for-
mation. Whenever possible, studies from communication science 
and political science are included. 
The review is organized as follows: First, the basic concepts 
of affect and cognition are defined. Next, I address the effects of 
media-induced affect on political judgments. In addition to em-
pirical findings, I further discuss the underlying mechanisms and 
the differential influence of relevant versus irrelevant affect. The 
review ends with a synopsis of the central findings on the influ-
ence of affect on political opinion and a discussion of the impli-
cations associated with these findings. 
 
Emotion, mood, arousal, and cognition 
Posing the question of how emotions influence political judg-
ments implies the perception of emotion as an extraneous factor 
that intrudes into political thinking. The dualistic view of reason 
and emotion as two distinct entities has a long tradition in phi-
losophy (cf. Ulich & Mayring 2003). In psychology, it is gener-
ally accepted to broadly distinguish between cognition and affect 
as two categories roughly corresponding to reason and emotion 
(cf. Clore, Wyer et al. 2001; Otto, Euler, & Mandl 2000; Zajonc 
1998). Nevertheless, modern psychology has struggled to arrive 
at clear-cut definitions of concepts such as emotion and cogni-
tion and methods of differentiating between them (LeDoux 
1999; McDermott 2004). In particular, scholars vary in how they 
define cognition and affect. Broadly defined, cognition and cog-
nitive processes comprise all forms of information processing 
and the corresponding mental representations within the brain 
(e.g., Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Hugenberg 2003; Lazarus 1984; 
Leventhal & Scherer 1987). In this account, cognition is not 
bound to consciousness but may function outside of an individ-
ual’s awareness. Based on a more narrow definition rooted in the 
dualistic view of reasoning, cognition comprises all conscious 
thoughts, beliefs, and recollections (e.g., Marcus 2002). Such a 
narrow understanding of cognition emphasizes reflective and 
rule-based processes and deemphasizes reflexive and automatic 
processes (cf. Lieberman et al. 2002; Smith & Neumann 2005). 
Cognition is more or less equated with conscious and effortful 
reasoning and processes such as interpretation, judgment, and 
decision-making (cf. Blanchette & Richards 2010). This review 
takes the broad definition of cognition, with cognitive states 
perceived to lie on a continuum between the extremes of auto-
matic versus intentional. Political reasoning and judgment pro-
cesses are examples of higher (i.e., conscious and controlled) 
cognitive processes. In contrast, implicit and automatic process-
es, such as awareness and recognition, are regarded as lower 
cognitive processes (cf. Bodenhausen et al. 2003). Thus, we 
focus on higher cognitive processes in our review of affective 
influences on political judgment. Accordingly, affect must be 
conceptually differentiated from higher cognition. 
Generally perceived as complementary to (higher) cognition, 
affect includes all types of emotional reactions. Emotions, 
moods, and arousal are referred to as affective phenomena 
(Frijda 1993; Otto et al. 2000; Petty, Gleicher, & Baker 1991). 
In other words, moods, emotions, and arousal represent certain 
types of affect. However, what is the shared characteristic under-
lying different types of affective phenomena? According to 
Wyer, Clore & Isbell (1999, p. 3) “affect refers to the positively 
or negatively valenced subjective reactions that a person experi-
ences at a given point in time. These reactions are experienced 
as either pleasant or unpleasant feelings.” Hence, affect has two 
characteristics. First, affect is a subjective reaction that is expe-
rienced as a feeling. Second, affect informs the individual about 
the valence or value of something. However, affect differs from 
cognition, which can also contain evaluative meaning (e.g., 
Breckler & Wiggins 1989; Eagly & Chaiken 1993), in that the 
former represents feeling, that is, the subjective experience of 
bodily changes and reactions (Damasio 1994; Frijda 1993; Wyer 
et al. 1999; Zajonc 1998). For example, feeling happy is the 
subjective experience of pleasant bodily changes and reactions. 
However, when an individual reflects on his or her current 
mood, the notion “I am happy” would represent cognition. Neu-
ropsychological studies demonstrate that different (but interact-
ing) brain systems underlie cognitive and affective responses 
(Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1999). 
Moods and emotions are two distinct affective states that are 
typically differentiated based on three criteria: their duration, 
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intensity, and specificity (or reference to an object) (Forgas 
1992; Frijda 1993; Lazarus 1991; Otto et al. 2000). Moods are 
low in intensity, high in longevity, and do not refer to an object. 
Emotions are high in intensity, low in longevity, and refer to an 
object. The most important criterion for differentiating between 
moods and emotions concerns object relations (Frijda 1993; 
Otto et al. 2000). Emotions are typically geared toward a specif-
ic object: One is afraid of or angry about something. In contrast, 
moods often lack any direct relation to an object. A person in an 
irritated mood might react to various objects or events with an-
noyance (Frijda 1993).1 The varying specificity of emotions and 
moods entails that moods, compared to emotions, can influence 
a bigger set of judgments (cf. Clore & Huntsinger 2009; Forgas 
1995; Schwarz & Clore 1988). This idea will be further dis-
cussed in a later section. 
In addition to mood and emotion, arousal has been described 
as an important affective phenomenon. In contrast to mood and 
emotion, arousal is regarded as a dimension or component of an 
affective state instead of being an affective state per se (e.g., 
Russell 1980; Schachter & Singer 1962). According to two-
dimensional models of affect, affect is structured in terms of 
valence and arousal. In other words, all affective states can be 
arranged in a two-dimensional space with “valence” and “arous-
al” as the two axes. Arousal has also been defined as a central 
component of emotional experiences. Schachter and Singer 
(1962) proposed that emotional feelings result from the cogni-
tive interpretation of physiological arousal. Although some have 
described arousal as a multidimensional construct (e.g., Thayer 
1978), most researchers perceive arousal as a bipolar continuum 
between deactivation and activation (Russell & Feldman Barrett 
1999). According to Kroeber-Riel (1979), arousal or activation 
“provides the organism with energy and is responsible for the 
psychological and motor activity of the organism.” (p. 241). In 
contrast to valence, which is perceived as a feeling of pleasant-
ness, arousal is experienced as a feeling of mobilization or ener-
gy (Russell 2003). Arousal is often associated with affective 
intensity. However, whether arousal contributes to or constitutes 
affective intensity is a matter of continued debate (cf. Reisenzein 
1994; Sonnemans & Frijda 1994; Storbeck & Clore 2008). In 
the following discussion, arousal is regarded as an affective 
reaction ranging from low to high activation, with high activa-
tion being associated with high affective intensity and low 
arousal being associated with low affective intensity. 
Reconsidering the object relations of affect, it should be not-
ed that the reference object of an affective state is not necessarily 
its cause (Frijda 1993). Moods may not refer to a specific object, 
although they may be triggered by a specific object or event. In 
fact, moods can relate to various objects as the residual of an 
emotion that has dissipated and lost its object focus. Similarly, 
residual arousal may be projected onto objects that did not orig-
inally cause the affective reaction (Zillmann 1991). An emotion 
may also be directed toward an object that was not its original 
trigger. Specifically, as the initial object focus diminishes, the 
                                                 
1 It is a semantic question whether to term a mood state with a reference 
object a “mood” and to term an emotional state without a reference 
object “emotion”. The crucial issue is that such affective states exist and 
that they may influence judgments (cf. Han, Lerner, & Keltner 2007). 
associated affect becomes attributable to a wider range of ob-
jects (Schwarz & Clore 1988; Wyer et al. 1999). Nonetheless, 
compared to moods, emotions are less likely to influence judg-
ments that are not inherently related to the emotion-inducing 
event (e.g., Schwarz 1990). The reason for the selectivity of 
emotional influence lies in the cognitive content of emotions: 
“Emotions arise in response to the meaning structures of given 
situations; different emotions arise in response to different 
meaning structures.” (Frijda 1988, p. 349). In other words, a 
particular emotion, such as anger or fear, is the result of an as-
sessment of a specific situation or object. Different situations 
and objects tend to trigger different emotions. Likewise, the 
currently prevalent appraisal approach to emotion postulates that 
an emotion is evoked by the evaluation of an event on multiple 
cognitive dimensions (e.g., Ellsworth & Scherer 2003; Lazarus 
1991; Smith & Ellsworth 1985).2 For example, fear is elicited 
when an individual appraises a situation as threatening and per-
ceives no possibility to cope with the threat. Thus, emotions 
exhibit a cognitive specificity that reduces their sphere of influ-
ence (Frijda 1993; Han, Lerner, & Keltner 2007). In contrast, 
moods have little or no cognitive content, can typically be re-
duced to their valence, and, thus, be projected onto a broad 
range of objects (e.g., Forgas 1992; Schwarz & Clore 1988). 
The same is true for arousal, which sphere of influence is not 
cognitively constrained. 
The previous remarks suggest that judgment can be influ-
enced by both affect that is related and affect that is unrelated to 
the judgment itself. An affective state (such as moods, emotions, 
and arousal) is considered related to a judgment when the affec-
tive state is caused by the object being evaluated. An affective 
state caused by a different object is considered unrelated.3 In 
social psychological research, unrelated affect is typically in-
duced by presenting subjects with emotional stimuli (e.g., For-
gas 1992; DeSteno et al. 2004) or instructing subjects to recall 
emotional life events (e.g., Small & Lerner 2008; Tiedens & 
Linton 2001). These approaches may be suitable in social psy-
chological models that assume the effects of related and unrelat-
ed affects to be similar and are less concerned with the specific 
source of affect (e.g., Forgas 2002; Han et al. 2007; Schwarz 
1990). However, whether related and unrelated emotions indeed 
have the same persuasive impact is an open question. 
On the one hand, related and unrelated affects are unlikely to 
differ with regard to their experiential quality. Given that both 
forms of affect are experienced as feelings, then related and 
unrelated affect should influence judgments similarly. On the 
other hand, related and unrelated affects differ with regard to 
                                                 
2 Appraisal theories are usually based on a broad understanding of 
cognition, that is, cognitive appraisal may be automatic or conscious (cf. 
Leventhal & Scherer 1987). 
3 According to this clear-cut definition, affect is or is not relevant to a 
particular judgment. Alternatively, one might perceive the judgment-
relatedness of affect on a continuum. Depending on its cause, affect may 
be more or less relevant to various judgments. For instance, affect that is 
elicited by a news article about the economic crisis may be central to an 
evaluation of the economy but less central to an evaluation of the 
general state of the nation. 
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their causes. Related affect may constitute a learned response4 
that is activated regularly when encountering an object. Alterna-
tively, related affect may constitute an immediate reaction to-
ward a present stimulus that is not dictated by preexisting evalu-
ations (Bodenhausen et al. 2001; Perrott & Bodenhausen 2002). 
In contrast, unrelated affect is neither a learned nor a current 
reaction toward the object under consideration. Rather, unrelated 
affect is caused by an object or issue not genuinely related to the 
object under judgment. Thus, the question must be addressed as 
to whether the experiential quality or the cause of affect is more 
dominant in determining the affective influences on judgments. 
If the experiential quality is more dominant, then related and 
unrelated affects should yield similar effects. If the cause is more 
dominant, then related and unrelated affects should yield differ-
ential effects. 
In summary, political judgment may be influenced by affec-
tive reactions with different triggers and of varying cognitive 
complexity. Affect can influence the evaluation of objects caus-
ing the affective reaction and objects that bear no causal rela-
tionship with the affective reaction. Moods are low in cognitive 
complexity, which allows them to influence a broad array of 
judgments. In a similar way, arousal may be projected onto vari-
ous objects. In contrast, emotions exhibit a higher cognitive 
specificity that reduces their sphere of influence. Previous re-
search has mainly focused on the persuasive effects of unrelated 
affect based on the assumption that related and unrelated affects 
yield similar effects. In this review, I specifically emphasize the 
question regarding whether related and unrelated affects might 
have a differential persuasive impact on higher cognitive judg-
ment processes. 
 
Affective influences on information 
processing and opinion formation 
In the following section, I review the influence of media-induced 
affect on political opinions. The review focuses on the three 
affective phenomena that have received the most attention in 
persuasion research—mood, arousal, and emotion—with an 
emphasis on the differences between processing effects and per-
suasive or attitudinal effects of affect. An attitude is an evalua-
tion of an object on a continuum ranging from “completely 
negative” to “completely positive” (Eagly & Chaiken 1993). In 
this account, persuasion is the process in which an attitude is 
changed. Affect has a persuasive effect if its characteristics (e.g., 
the valence or cognitive structure) are transferred to an attitude, 
that is, if affect leads to affect-congruent attitudes. This is the 
case, for instance, when the valence of a positive mood is pro-
jected onto a politician. Thus, attitudinal effects imply a corre-
                                                 
4 Emotional learning can be accomplished by both elaborated and 
automatic processes (LeDoux 1999; Leventhal and Scherer 1987; Smith 
and Neumann 2005). However, once an association has been 
established, the affective reaction will be automatically activated when 
the stimulus is encountered (LeDoux 1999; Smith and DeCoster 2000). 
Importantly, neuropsychological findings suggest that individuals do not 
store the affect itself but associations between a stimulus and an 
affective reaction (i.e., reaction patterns) and that such associations can 
be activated at a later encounter (LeDoux 1999). 
spondence between the characteristics of a present affective state 
(e.g., the valence of the mood) and the characteristics of an atti-
tude that is formed (e.g., the valence of the attitude). In other 
words, affect influences what attitudes are formed. 
In contrast, processing effects refer to the influence of affect 
on information processing (e.g., depth of information pro-
cessing). Processing effects do not entail a correspondence be-
tween the characteristics of an affective state and a formed opin-
ion, that is, they do not produce affect-congruent attitudes. For 
example, a positive mood may decrease the depth of processing 
without directly increasing the positivity of a political judgment. 
Nevertheless, processing effects of affect have persuasive impli-
cations. In other words, by influencing information processing, 
affect determines how attitudes are formed. Hence, in the next 
sections, the processing effects of moods, arousal, and emotions 
are first addressed, followed by a discussion of the attitudinal 
ramifications of affect. Each section is divided into three parts: 
First, empirical findings on the influence of mood, arousal, or 
emotion are reviewed. Second, theoretical models that explain 
these influences are described. Finally, the differential effects of 
related and unrelated affects on political judgment are discussed. 
 
The processing effects of affect 
Effects of mood on information processing 
Empirical findings. When investigating the effects of mood on 
information processing, social psychologists are generally inter-
ested in how the amount and quality of information processing 
are differentially impacted by positive versus negative moods 
that are unrelated to the information being processed. In other 
words, the mood is induced by stimuli that exhibit no thematic 
relation to the object or message to be evaluated. Findings indi-
cate that positive moods are typically associated with a cursory, 
heuristic, and creative processing style, whereas negative moods 
tend to prompt an attentive, detailed, and conservative style of 
processing information (cf. Bless & Fiedler 2006; Bless & 
Schwarz 1999).  
Mackie and Worth (1989, experiment 1) demonstrated that 
positive mood decreased processing depth in comparison to 
neutral mood. The results showed that, when the time to process 
the message was limited, individuals in a good mood were 
equally persuaded by strong and weak arguments surrounding 
the issue of governmental regulation and acid rain. These mood 
effects on processing were replicated in follow-up studies. In 
addition, these studies demonstrated that positive mood, relative 
to neutral mood, increased the impact of source expertise in the 
evaluation of issues such as gun control (Mackie & Worth 1989, 
experiment 2), and reduced the recall of processed information 
(Stroessner & Mackie 1992, experiment, 2). Happy individuals 
tend to process information only superficially and base their 
decisions on heuristics such as party identification, the credibil-
ity of the communicator, or the opinion of the majority, even 
though the happy mood bears little relevance to the judgment 
being made. 
In contrast, negative moods have been shown to induce a 
more systematic processing of information and more elaborated 
judgments (Chartrand, van Baaren, & Bargh 2006; Forgas & 
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Bower 1987; Schwarz 1990). Bless and colleagues (1990) found 
that sad individuals were more persuaded by strong arguments 
than by weak arguments, whereas happy individuals were equal-
ly persuaded by weak and strong arguments. Furthermore, the 
authors found that negative mood led to counter-arguments in 
response to weak arguments, whereas positive mood did not. 
This finding suggests that negative mood facilitates more careful 
processing of available information, which allows individuals to 
identify weak arguments. 
Mood effects on processing have been shown to be contin-
gent on political expertise. Hsu and Price (1993) found that 
negative mood increased processing depth in comparison to 
positive mood only when political expertise was high. Mood had 
no influence on information processing when political expertise 
was low. This finding implies that negative mood promotes bet-
ter analytical processing only for individuals whose cognitive 
abilities permit such processing. 
Moods have also been shown to influence the reliance on 
stereotypes during judgment formation. Bodenhausen, Kramer, 
and Süsser (1994) found that, compared to neutral mood, posi-
tive mood increases the use of stereotypes. In a series of experi-
ments conducted at a U.S. university, the researchers showed 
that happy participants rated the guilt of an alleged delinquent as 
significantly higher when the delinquent was identified as mem-
ber of a stereotyped group (e.g., the Hispanic minority). No such 
difference emerged for participants in the neutral mood condi-
tion. Similarly, Park and Banaji (2000) discovered that happy 
individuals judged more African American names than European 
American names as the name of a criminal. For individuals in a 
neutral mood, the effect was significantly weaker. In contrast, 
negative mood has been shown to prompt individuals to rely on 
individuating information instead of category information when 
forming an opinion (Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland 1996). 
The findings indicate that unrelated positive mood hinders 
the analytical processing of information. Happy individuals tend 
to produce fewer counter-arguments in response to persuasive 
messages, to fail to differentiate between strong and weak argu-
ments, and to rely on cognitive shortcuts and stereotypes during 
judgment formation. In contrast, unrelated negative moods are 
associated with systematic processing and the analysis of indi-
viduating information instead of category information. The ef-
fects of mood on processing have been found across issues such 
as student service fees (Bless et al. 1990), the adoption of com-
prehensive university exams for graduation (Kuykendall & Keat-
ing 1990; Mitchell 2000), condom usage and health-related food 
choice (Armitage, Conner, & Norman 1999), character judgment 
(Chartrand, van Baaren, & Bargh 2006; Forgas & Bower 1987), 
and attitudes toward social groups (Stroessner & Mackie 1992). 
Mechanisms. Researchers have proposed different theoreti-
cal explanations for the effects of mood on information pro-
cessing. On the one hand, some have argued that moods may 
reduce the cognitive capacity of individuals to process infor-
mation (e.g., Mackie & Worth 1989; Isen 1987). For example, 
Mackie and Worth (1989) argue that positive moods activate a 
large amount of memory content with positive valence, which, in 
turn, occupy and diminish the available cognitive resources. This 
notion is supported by the finding that positive mood impaired 
discrimination between strong and weak arguments only when 
processing time was limited. When processing time was not 
constrained, the compensation of reduced processing resources 
became possible. 
The capacity hypothesis of mood effects on processing has 
been questioned by different authors (Bless 2000; Fiedler 2001; 
Forgas 1992). According to Bless (2000), the major point of 
criticism is that the capacity hypothesis has never been ade-
quately tested given that cognitive capacity has not been directly 
assessed. A more prominent position relates to the argument that 
mood does not influence cognitive capacity but rather the moti-
vation to process information. According to the affect-as-
information approach (e.g., Schwarz 1990, Schwarz & Clore 
2003)5, affective states serve as adaptive indicators of whether a 
situation is benign or hazardous. Specifically, positive moods 
convey to the individual that the environment is benign, that no 
personal goals are threatened, and that no particular effort has to 
be expended. Negative moods signal to the individual that the 
situation is threatening and that some effort has to be expended 
to achieve a positive outcome. In turn, positive mood is associ-
ated with a weak motivation to process information, whereas 
negative mood is associated with a strong motivation to process 
information. 
An argument that aligns with the mood-as-information per-
spective has been put forward by Bless (2000, 2001). Bless ar-
gues that mood influences a person’s reliance on established 
schemata and knowledge structures. Because positive moods 
suggest that a situation is benign, an individual can depend on 
everyday routines that have proven reliable (and have, thus, 
been consolidated over time). Negative moods signal the exist-
ence of a problem that necessitates refraining from standard 
procedures and performing a detailed analysis of the situation. 
Similarly, Fiedler (2001) argues that positive moods support 
assimilative (top-down) information processing and negative 
moods support accommodative (bottom-up) information pro-
cessing. In other words, individuals in a positive mood tend to 
impose learned schemata on external stimuli (e.g., stereotypes), 
whereas individuals in a negative mood seek the detailed dissec-
tion of a stimulus. 
Related versus unrelated moods. The notion that affective 
states help individuals adapt to their environment is based on the 
assumption that information processing is typically influenced 
by relevant moods. Thus, mood can support an individual’s 
adaptation only if it is relevant to a judgment situation. Howev-
er, studies on the effects of moods on processing have generally 
involved the induction of unrelated moods (e.g., Mackie & 
Worth 1989; Schwarz & Clore 1983). Furthermore, theorizing 
about the differential effects of related and unrelated moods has 
taken place mainly in the context of attitudinal mood effects. 
The mood-as- information approach postulates that mood influ-
ences on attitudes may be discounted when the irrelevance of the 
mood is acknowledged (cf. section on moods and opinion for-
mation for a detailed discussion). Thus, one might expect that 
                                                 
5 The approach was originally applied to explain the effects of mood on 
judgment. Following Schwarz and Clore (2003), I refer to the 
corresponding effects as “mood-as-information” to avoid any 
misunderstanding.  
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mood effects on information processing to be discounted in a 
similar fashion. Specifically, once an individual realizes that his 
or her mood state is not relevant for the current processing task, 
the mood-induced processing motivation may be corrected. In 
other words, individuals may actively correct mood influences 
on processing when prompted to do so (cf. Schwarz 2001). This 
notion received corroboration from Bless and colleagues (1990), 
who found that individuals in a positive mood processed infor-
mation systematically when they were instructed to pay attention 
to the quality of arguments. The possibility of cognitive correc-
tion implies that unrelated moods should be discounted more 
often than related moods as individuals may notice the irrele-
vance of the unrelated moods for the processing task. According-
ly, compared to unrelated moods, the influence of related moods 
on information processing should have greater consistency. 
 
Effects of arousal on information processing 
Empirical findings. Emotional arousal is generally assumed to 
facilitate information processing. Studies have shown that arous-
ing television content increases one’s level of attention (Lang, 
Newhagen, & Reeves 1996), enhances information processing 
(Grabe & Kamhawi 2006; Lang, Bolls et al. 1999), and im-
proves comprehension and recall (Grabe & Kamhawi 2006; 
Grabe, Yegiyan, & Kamhawi 2008; Lang et al. 1996). 
Grabe and Kamhawi (2006) presented male and female par-
ticipants with positively and negatively framed news stories. The 
results show that men reported higher arousal for negative news 
stories than they did for positive news stories. In contrast, wom-
en perceived positive news stories as more arousing. According-
ly, men encoded the negative messages more deeply and had a 
better comprehension of the negative stories compared to posi-
tive stories, whereas women encoded and comprehended the 
positive stories better than they did the negative stories. Similar-
ly, Martin, Laing, Martin, and Mitchell (2005) found that arousal 
fostered more systematic processing of a persuasive message 
concerning euthanasia (i.e., strong and weak arguments could be 
better distinguished). The findings support the notion that arous-
al prompts individuals to process messages more carefully.  
However, some studies have shown that high levels of 
arousal may impair detailed information processing. Newhagen 
and Reeves (1992) found that highly negative images (e.g., im-
ages of war or catastrophes) reduce the level of recall for a news 
story. Compared to news stories without a negative image, sto-
ries with compelling negative images increased long term 
memory for visual information but decreased the number of 
topics and the amount of narrative information remembered. 
Similarly, Sanbonmatsu and Kardes (1988) demonstrated that 
judgment heuristics had a stronger influence on one’s attitude 
toward a persuasive message when the level of arousal was high 
rather than moderate. At the same time, argument strength was 
more important under moderate arousal compared to high arous-
al. 
It has been argued that excessive emotional arousal dimin-
ishes information processing and that optimal levels of pro-
cessing are reached at moderate arousal levels (Easterbrook 
1959; Kroeber-Riel 1979). Therefore, the relationship between 
arousal and the depth of processing is assumed to be curvilinear. 
Accordingly, Lang and colleagues (Lang, Potter, & Bolls 1999; 
Grabe, Lang, & Zhao 2003) demonstrated that media messages 
that contained multiple arousing components hindered infor-
mation processing. Compared to a standard presentation of a 
news story, a tabloid presentation (i.e., an arousing presentation 
style) was shown to increase the accuracy of recall for calm 
stories but not for arousing stories (Grabe et al. 2003). Similarly, 
faster pacing of television messages facilitated the recognition of 
semantic content for messages with calm content but hindered 
recognition for arousing messages (Lang, Potter, & Bolls 1999). 
Mechanisms. Arousal is generally assumed to influence in-
formation processing by affecting the allocation of cognitive 
resources. Accordingly, emotion-eliciting stimuli activate the 
automatic attention system and compel the allocation of re-
sources to the sub-processes of encoding and storage (Lang 
2000; Cahill & McGaugh 1998; Phelps 2004). Storbeck and 
Clore (2008) propose that, similar to mood, arousal helps indi-
viduals adapt to their environment by signaling importance or 
urgency—an effect they name arousal-as-information. However, 
recall for processed content is impaired once a certain arousal 
threshold is exceeded. Easterbrook (1959; also cf. Clore & 
Schnall 2005; Pham 1992) argues that increasing arousal tends 
to narrow one’s focus. Accordingly, high arousal may reduce the 
total amount of information processed given that attention is 
focused on the most relevant aspects of the stimulus. The nar-
rowed focus may initially facilitate information processing by 
ignoring irrelevant information. However, highly aroused indi-
viduals are likely to also ignore relevant information, which can 
impair their processing performance. 
Related versus unrelated arousal. Studies on the effects of 
arousal on processing have focused on the effects of both related 
and unrelated arousal. Formal features of political news stories, 
such as tabloid presentation or fast pacing, may induce unrelated 
arousal that, in turn, intensifies the related arousal induced by 
the actual content of the news messages. Depending on the level 
of arousal associated with the news content, the formal features 
of the news story may increase (if a topic is weakly arousing) or 
decrease message processing (if a topic is highly arousing). In a 
similar vein, the excitation transfer hypothesis (cf. Zillmann 
1991) suggests that residual arousal, stemming from preceding 
affective reactions, may intensify current emotional reactions. 
Accordingly, unrelated and related arousal may accumulate, and 
the total arousal level may be perceived as a genuine reaction to 
the current content of thought. This process may have implica-
tions for the processing of current media content, that is, it may 
facilitate or hinder processing depending on the level of total 
arousal. 
 
Effects of discrete emotions on information processing 
Empirical findings. Research on emotions has demonstrated that 
affective states of the same valence may have differential effects 
on information processing. These studies have mainly focused 
on the processing effects of anger, fear and sadness. Other nega-
tive emotions, such as guilt (Bohner & Weinerth 2001) or dis-
gust (Tiedens & Linton 2001), and positive emotions (Gris-
kevicius, Shiota, & Neufeld 2010) have received less attention. 
Fear has been shown to encourage more careful processing, 
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whereas anger has been associated with cursory information 
processing. Some studies found argument strength to be more 
important when individuals were fearful (Bohner & Weinerth 
2001; Meijnders, Midden, & Wilke 2001). Meijnders and col-
leagues (2001) demonstrated that fear of climate change promot-
ed systematic processing of information. The quality of argu-
ments in a message about an energy efficient light bulb influ-
enced the attitude toward the light bulb for individuals in the 
moderate fear condition but not for individuals in the low fear 
condition and the control group. In other words, only fearful 
individuals were able to distinguish between strong and weak 
arguments. Similarly, fear has been shown to increase attention 
and learning. Brader (2005) found that a fear-inducing political 
ad (compared to a negative baseline ad) stimulated higher vigi-
lance and encouraged the consideration of current issues and 
trait evaluations of political candidates during judgment for-
mation. Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, and Davis (2008) found 
that fear increased attention to political campaigns and improved 
the learning of political information. Further studies show that 
fear not only increases processing depth but also reduces the 
reliance on judgment heuristics. Tiedens and Linton (2001) 
found that fear and hope (i.e., emotions associated with low 
certainty), relative to disgust and happiness (i.e., high certainty 
emotions), led to more careful information processing. More 
precisely, emotions associated with certainty increased the ten-
dency to use judgment heuristics and rely on stereotypes and 
decreased the tendency to engage in systematic information pro-
cessing. In contrast, emotions associated with uncertainty re-
duced the tendency to rely on shortcuts and promoted more care-
ful processing of information. Along similar lines, fear has been 
shown to reduce the use of the party heuristic in voting decisions 
(Marcus & MacKuen 1993) and decrease the reliance on prior 
preferences (Brader 2005). 
Anger is generally associated with a more cursory processing 
of information and a reliance on heuristics. Small and Lerner 
(2008) found that anger, relative to sadness, led to less elaborat-
ed information processing of a message about a welfare case. 
Angry individuals processed information less carefully and re-
tained their first impression of individual responsibility, whereas 
sad individuals processed more systematically and corrected for 
their initial bias. Specifically, sad individuals favored increasing 
the provision of social welfare more strongly than did angry 
individuals. Similarly, anger has been shown to reduce the num-
ber of cues that individuals take into consideration (Lerner, 
Goldberg, & Tetlock 1998) and decrease the time needed to 
process information (Tiedens 2001). Anger has also been shown 
to increase the reliance on stereotypes, heuristics, and chronical-
ly accessible explanations (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer 
1994; Tiedens 2001). Bodenhausen and colleagues (1994) found 
that angry individuals were more likely to make judgments based 
on ethnic stereotypes and were more strongly influenced by 
source expertise than were individuals in the sadness condition 
or the control group. 
However, findings on the effects of anger and fear on pro-
cessing are not unequivocal. Nabi (1999) found that anger did 
not impair but rather increased information processing in com-
parison to fear. In this experiment, participants processed a mes-
sage that contained weak arguments in favor of a proposed do-
mestic terror legislation. Compared to individuals in the fear 
condition, angry individuals processed the message more care-
fully. Specifically, individuals in the anger condition, compared 
to those in the fear condition, generated more negative thoughts 
about the weak message, perceived the arguments to be weaker, 
and were less supportive of the legislation. 
Much of the research on emotional influences on infor-
mation processing has focused on negative emotions. Gris-
kevicius and colleagues (2010) investigated the way in which 
information processing was influenced by positive emotions 
including anticipatory enthusiasm, contentment, attachment 
love, nurturant love, amusement, and awe. Participants read a 
persuasive message containing either weak or strong arguments 
regarding a university policy. The results show that the strong 
arguments were equally persuasive across all emotion condi-
tions. The weak arguments were more persuasive for participants 
in the amusement, anticipatory enthusiasm, and attachment love 
conditions than those in the neutral control condition. In con-
trast, participants in the awe and nurturant love conditions rated 
the weak arguments to be significantly less persuasive than did 
those in the control group. Thus, positive emotions of the same 
valence had differential effects on the depth of information pro-
cessing. 
Mechanisms. Researchers have explained mood influences 
on information processing by appealing to the signaling function 
of moods. In this account, the valence of a mood has informative 
value for the individual and facilitates the required information 
processing (Schwarz 1990). Research on the processing effects 
of emotion has extended this perspective by arguing that emo-
tions also have informative value and similarly influence infor-
mation processing (Griskevicius et al. 2010; Nabi 1999; Tiedens 
& Linton 2001). The argument is based on functional emotion 
theories asserting that emotions have an adaptive function for 
humans (e.g., Frijda 1988; Lazarus 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Col-
lins 1988). Based on these theories, emotions result from the 
cognitive appraisal of a situation and motivate the individual to 
perform appropriate actions with regard to situational demands. 
For instance, in a threatening situation in which it is impossible 
to avert the threat, an individual is likely to experience fear, 
which motivates him or her to escape from the threatening ob-
ject. According to the cognitive appraisal perspective, specific 
emotions result from cognitive evaluations of a situation (e.g., 
valence, goal congruency, action tendency, and agency) (Ells-
worth & Scherer 2003; Roseman 2001). In other words, each 
emotional response is associated with a given configuration of 
cognitive appraisals. Considering the signaling function of affec-
tive states, every dimension of appraisal may carry information 
and influence information processing. Consequently, in contrast 
to moods, emotions of the same valence may promote differing 
processing styles. 
As demonstrated by Nabi (2002), the associated action ten-
dency, or goal-orientation, is an important aspect of emotions. 
According to Roseman and colleagues (Roseman 2001; Rose-
man, Wiest, & Swartz 1994), every discrete emotion entails a 
specific action tendency that allows the individual to quickly 
adapt to situational demands. Action tendencies typically belong 
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to two categories. On the one hand, emotions may entail an ap-
petitive motive, that is, the desire to get more of something re-
warding. This first class of emotions, often labeled “approach 
emotions”, comprises emotions such as joy, pride, or anger. On 
the other hand, emotions may entail an aversive motive, that is, 
the desire to obtain less of something punishing or harmful. This 
second class of emotions, often labeled “avoidance emotions”, 
comprises emotions such as disgust, shame, or fear (Nabi 1999; 
Roseman 2001). Hence, differential information processing may 
result from an emotion-specific motivation to attend to and pro-
cess a stimulus (cf. Nabi 1999, 2002). Based on this account, 
anger should facilitate information processing by motivating the 
individual to attend to a stimulus, whereas fear should hinder 
processing by signaling the individual to retreat. Nonetheless, 
Nabi’s (1999, 2002) Cognitive Functional Model postulates that 
the relationship between emotion and processing may be more 
complex. In particular, the effect of emotion on information 
processing may be moderated by expectations about the availa-
ble message. More precisely, approach and avoidance emotions 
should only lead to differential message processing when the 
individual is sure that the available message will be of use for 
reaching his or her motivational goal determined by the current 
emotion. Otherwise, approach and avoidance emotions are as-
sumed to trigger comparable processing. However, empirical 
support for this notion is still weak (cf. Nabi 2002). 
Other studies have shown that anger, compared to fear, does 
not enhance but impairs information processing. The conflicting 
results may be explained by the fact that certain appraisal dimen-
sions associated with emotions can also influence information 
processing. Tiedens and Linton (2001; for a similar argument see 
Lerner & Keltner 2001) argue that certainty appraisals hinder 
careful information processing. Specifically, certainty appraisals 
associated with anger may hinder information processing by 
signaling to the individual that the situation is under control and 
that no effort has to be expended. In contrast, uncertainty ap-
praisals associated with fear tend to promote more careful in-
formation processing. 
The theoretical arguments and the empirical findings indi-
cate that different aspects of emotions may have implications 
(albeit sometimes contradictory ones) for information pro-
cessing. Multiple mediating processes determine the way in 
which emotion influences information processing. For example, 
anger may motivate the individual to pay attention but may, at 
the same time, reduce processing depth via the increase of expe-
rienced certainty. In other words, discrete emotions may have 
unique effects on processing by exhibiting a unique configura-
tion of appraisals, physiological reactions, and behavioral impli-
cations. Accordingly, Griskevicius and colleagues (2010) argue 
that different processes may underlie the relationship between 
distinct emotions and information processing. For example, 
anticipatory enthusiasm may hinder careful information pro-
cessing via increasing the reliance on internal knowledge struc-
tures. In contrast, attachment love may hinder careful processing 
by being associated with trust, acceptance, and reduced individ-
ual responsibility. Indeed, the authors found that, compared to 
the neutral control group, different positive emotions were asso-
ciated with more systematic or heuristic processing, with the 
effects mediated by specific variables including perceived cer-
tainty or responsibility. 
Related versus unrelated emotions. A further explanation of 
the inconsistent findings concerns the differential relatedness of 
emotional states. Nabi (2002) induced in an experiment related 
emotions given that the induction messages addressed the same 
topic as the persuasive message (i.e., domestic terrorism). How-
ever, in most other studies, the induced emotions were unrelated 
to the issue that was being evaluated (e.g., Bodenhausen, Shep-
pard, & Kramer 1994; Griskevicius et al. 2010; Tiedens & Lin-
ton 2001). Differential effects of anger on information pro-
cessing may, hence, be explained by differences in the target 
object associated with the induced anger. Specifically, related 
anger should encourage an approach reaction toward the object 
to be evaluated, whereas unrelated anger should reduce the at-
tention directed toward the experimental stimulus by focus at-
tention on a different object or issue. In other words, related and 
unrelated emotions differ with regard to the object in focus of 
the emotion. In addition, one would expect the processing ef-
fects of emotions to be discounted (as with the effects of unre-
lated moods) when their irrelevance for the processing task is 
noticed. This relationship awaits future empirical validation.  
Taken together, the findings indicate that moods, arousal, 
and discrete emotions have important implications for the pro-
cessing of political information. Negative moods, moderate 
arousal, and emotions that are associated with approach and 
uncertainty are likely to support a careful analysis of political 
information. Positive moods, low arousal, and emotions associ-
ated with avoidance and certainty are likely to impair a detailed 
analysis of political messages, prompt a reliance on judgment 
heuristics and stereotypes, and diminish the importance of ar-
gument quality in judgment processes. Thus, affect is an im-
portant factor in determining how political messages are pro-
cessed and judgments generated, such as whether citizens make 
deliberative or automatic judgments. Furthermore, affect may 
also influence the formation of political attitudes. The attitudinal 
effects of affect are discussed in the next section. 
 
The attitudinal effects of affect 
Effects of moods on opinion formation 
Empirical findings. It is generally assumed that moods promote 
mood-congruent judgments (e.g., Bower 1981; Forgas 1995; 
Petty et al. 1991; Schwarz 1990). In other words, positive 
moods should foster the development of favorable attitudes 
toward a political object, whereas negative moods should nur-
ture negative attitudes. 
Several studies have demonstrated that moods may directly 
influence various political judgments. Isbell and colleagues 
(Isbell & Wyer 1999; Ottati & Isbell 1996) have demonstrated 
that moods may color the evaluations of politicians. In a line of 
experiments, the authors induced a positive or a negative mood 
in participants, who were then presented with messages about a 
political candidate. The results showed that mood was used as a 
judgment heuristic when systematic processing was rendered 
impossible by weak ability (i.e., weak political expertise) or 
motivation (i.e., weak political interest). Under these conditions, 
  
LIVING REVIEWS IN DEMOCRACY democracy.livingreviews.org  |  2012 
Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich and University of Zurich Living Reviews in Democracy, 2012  |  9 
positive mood promoted more positive evaluations of the politi-
cian than did negative mood. Similarly, mood has been shown to 
directly influence attitudes toward political institutions such as 
NAFTA (Rahn 2000), university policies (Albarracín & 
Kumkale 2003), and news stories (Wirth et al. 2010). 
However, mood may also influence political judgments indi-
rectly via coloring the thoughts of individuals. Petty, Schumann, 
Richman, and Strathman (1993) demonstrated both direct and 
indirect effects of mood in an experiment in which neutral or 
positive moods were induced in participants who then read a 
message about a new foster care program. The results show that 
positive mood led to more positive attitudes toward the program 
than neutral mood. More importantly, mood influenced attitudes 
directly when individuals were low in need for cognition or 
lacked motivation to elaborate the message. Mood influenced 
attitude indirectly when individuals processed the message care-
fully by modifying the positivity of the individuals’ thoughts 
about the program. 
Further studies corroborate the notion that mood may indi-
rectly influence political judgments via cognition. These studies 
show that mood can influence the perceived likelihood of events 
such as an atomic war or becoming the victim of a crime (Mayer 
et al. 1992), focus attention on mood-congruent information and 
promote mood-congruent recall (Forgas & Bower 1987; Bower 
1983), and foster the development of mood-congruent interpre-
tations and attributions (Forgas & Locke 2005).  
Thus far, only the assimilative effects (i.e., congruence ef-
fects) of mood on judgments have been discussed. Nonetheless, 
moods may also cause affect-incongruent judgments. In a study 
on mood influences on the evaluation of political candidates, 
Isbell and Wyer (1999) demonstrated that individuals who were 
sufficiently motivated to analyze candidate information pro-
duced mood-incongruent judgments. The authors interpreted 
these results to represent a cognitive overcorrection of presumed 
mood influences when individuals processed information sys-
tematically. Similarly, Ottati and Isbell (1996) found that indi-
viduals with low political expertise or low recall about candidate 
information produced mood-congruent candidate evaluations, 
whereas individuals with high expertise or high recall produced 
mood-incongruent evaluations. 
Mechanisms. Different mechanisms have been proposed to 
account for mood-congruency effects on judgments. Depending 
on the amount of processing applied by an individual, mood-
congruency effects are regarded as a consequence of the mood-
as-information heuristic or affective priming (Forgas 1995; Petty 
et al. 1993). Low motivation and/or the ability to process politi-
cal information promote superficial processing of information 
and the reliance on heuristics. Several cognitive heuristics, such 
as relying on the expertise of the communicator or the opinion of 
the majority, have been proposed (e.g., Lau & Redlawsk 2001). 
More importantly, individuals may also rely on their feelings to 
evaluate the target of political judgment. For example, a citizen 
may simply rely on his or her gut reaction toward a politician 
when being asked for an opinion. The main prerequisite for 
mood effects is the (mis-)attribution of the current mood to the 
object under consideration (Clore & Gasper 2000; Schwarz 
1990). The individual must consider his or her mood to be relat-
ed to the object under evaluation. According to the mood-as-
information approach, individuals generally link their current 
mood automatically to their current mental content when there 
are no concrete cues of their irrelevance (Clore, Gasper, & 
Gavin 2001). Influences of unrelated moods are believed to be a 
frequently occurring phenomenon (e.g., Schwarz 1990; Schwarz 
& Clore 1988). Thus, not only related but also unrelated moods 
may frequently influence political judgment processes despite 
their irrelevance to the concrete judgment at hand. 
When individuals process information carefully, they do not 
rely on heuristics but evaluate the arguments in favor of and 
against a politician or an issue position. Hence, careful pro-
cessing prevents the use of the mood-as-information heuristic. 
However, detailed elaboration does not impede mood influences 
mediated by other mechanisms. In fact, studies have shown that 
affective priming (or, more precisely, mood priming) may pro-
duce mood-congruent judgments under high elaboration. When 
information is processed carefully, moods may prime (i.e., acti-
vate) cognitive content of the same valence. In other words, 
positive mood should activate positive thoughts and negative 
mood should activate negative thoughts (e.g., Bower 1981; For-
gas & Bower 1987). The mood priming approach is based on the 
notion that individuals come to a decision not by considering all 
relevant information (given limitations of their cognitive re-
sources) but only the information that is currently accessible in 
their memory. By activating mood-congruent cognitive content, 
mood influences the sample of information used to generate a 
political judgment (cf. Kühne et al. 2011). Consequently, posi-
tive mood promotes more positive attitudes, whereas negative 
mood promotes negative evaluations. 
The mood-as-information heuristic and mood priming are 
generally seen as operating during different stages of the judg-
ment process. Specifically, the mood-as-information heuristic is 
considered a judgment heuristic that is applied after information 
processing, when the final evaluation is formed. Mood priming, 
however, is assumed to operate mainly during information pro-
cessing (Clore & Parrott 1991; Forgas 1995; Schwarz & Clore 
1988). In fact, mood priming involves a series of sub-processes 
that operate during different stages of information processing 
(Bower 1981; Forgas & Bower 1987; Schwarz & Clore 1988). 
First, moods may promote selective attention and encoding, that 
is, individuals are likely to turn to affectively congruent infor-
mation and process it for a longer duration than for mood-
incongruent stimuli. Second, moods promote the selective recall 
of mood-congruent information. Third, moods influence the 
interpretation of ambiguous situations by activating mood-
congruent categories and concepts that are used during infor-
mation processing. 
All of the above remarks address the question of how moods 
can produce mood-congruent judgments. However, how might 
mood-incongruent judgments be explained? One might assume 
that mood-incongruent judgments are not so much a conse-
quence of mood itself but, rather, cognitive correction processes 
applied when the individual notices the influence of mood on 
judgment. Isbell and colleagues (Isbell & Wyer 1999; Ottati & 
Isbell 1996) explain incongruence effects with their on-line 
affect-as-information hypothesis. According to this account, it is 
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typical for moods to pose assimilative effects on judgments for 
individuals with low processing efficiency who are unable to 
detect mood influences. In contrast, individuals with high pro-
cessing efficiency should be able to identify biasing mood ef-
fects and, in turn, correct them (also cf. Albarracín & Kumkale 
2003; Berkowitz et al. 2000). However, if individuals overesti-
mate the extent of their mood biases, correction processes may 
result in mood-incongruent attitudes. In other words, mood in-
fluences may be overcorrected such that the attitudes that result 
are opposite in valence compared with the current mood state. 
Although correction processes have been primarily discussed 
within the mood-as-information paradigm (e.g., Albarracín & 
Kumkale 2003; Schwarz & Clore 1983), some have proposed 
the possibility of discounting taking place during mood priming 
when the individual notices the absence of a causal link between 
the mood and the judgment (Clore & Parrott 1991; Forgas 1992; 
Martin 1986). Thus, when the individual realizes that his or her 
thoughts have been biased by the current mood, he or she may 
discount the primed concepts. In this way, mood-incongruent 
effects may arise when a judgment has been primed by moods. 
Related versus unrelated moods. Research on mood effects 
has typically relied on the experimental induction of unrelated 
moods. This procedure is popular for two reasons. First, the 
procedure prevents the confounding of cognitive and affective 
effects on judgments (cf. Clore, Gasper, & Gavin 2001): By 
keeping the stimulus information about the target object constant 
and varying only the induced mood, the true effects of mood can 
be identified. Second, the mood-as-information approach and 
the mood priming approach assume that related and unrelated 
moods have similar effects on judgments (Clore & Storbeck 
2006; Forgas 2002; Schwarz 1990). 
However, as already discussed, several studies within the 
mood-as-information paradigm have demonstrated that mood 
influences on judgments may be diminished or eliminated when 
the irrelevance of the existing mood is noticed (Albarracín & 
Kumkale 2003; Isbell & Wyer 1999; Keltner, Locke, & Audrain 
1993; Schwarz & Clore 1983). For instance, Isbell and Wyer 
(1999) demonstrated that the influence of unrelated mood on the 
evaluation of a political candidate was corrected when individu-
als were motivated—because of situational demands or their 
partisanship—to accurately examine the candidate. In fact, only 
weak partisans with a low motivation to evaluate the politician 
were subject to a misattribution of incidental mood. 
As already noted, the main prerequisite for mood effects is 
the (mis-) attribution of the current mood to the attitude object. 
A high motivation to form an accurate judgment and high pro-
cessing capacity (Albarracín & Kumkale 2003; Berkowitz et al. 
2000; Isbell & Wyer 1999; Ottati & Isbell 1996) allow the indi-
vidual to notice and correct mood influences. The possibility of 
mood discounting implies that related and unrelated moods may 
differ in their likelihood of being attributed to an object, with 
related moods being attributed to judgment objects more often 
than unrelated moods. On the one hand, related mood is unlikely 
to be discounted as it has indeed been caused by the object un-
der consideration. In this case, high ability and motivation to 
process information should not preclude the (correct) mood 
attribution. On the other hand, unrelated mood should be dis-
counted when the individual forms a careful judgment and no-
tices the misattribution. 
What about the differential priming effects of related and un-
related moods? Generally, both related and unrelated moods are 
assumed to prime judgments (Forgas 1995, 2002). However, the 
discounting of concepts primed by unrelated moods may also 
take place during mood priming (Clore & Parrott 1991; Forgas 
1992; Martin 1986) and related moods may lead to mood-
congruent judgments more regularly than do unrelated moods. 
Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect mood priming effects to 
be stronger for related mood. First, related mood is associated 
with cognitive content that is relevant to the judgment. Accord-
ingly, related mood promotes stronger priming effects because it 
first activates cognitions relevant to the judgment (i.e., infor-
mation that can be used to form the judgment). In contrast, there 
is no intrinsic relationship between unrelated mood and the 
mental content during judgment. Thus, unrelated mood is likely 
to activate irrelevant as well as relevant cognitions and mood 
priming effects are likely to dissipate. Second, unrelated mood is 
likely to be of lower intensity than related mood as unrelated 
mood is, by definition, triggered by earlier incidents and not by 
the object under current consideration. Thus, the activation im-
pulse of unrelated mood should be weaker. 
All in all, the evidence suggests that unrelated moods, com-
pared with related moods, should be discounted more often and 
associated with weaker priming effects. Mood discounting re-
quires the individual to notice the incorrectness of the mood 
attribution. Accordingly, related and unrelated moods may be 
similar in effect when cognitive capacity and processing motiva-
tion are low. However, with increasing capacity and motivation, 
it becomes more likely for unrelated mood to be discounted, 
with only related mood used as a judgment heuristic. At the 
same time, both related and unrelated moods may prime cogni-
tive content when processing intensity is high. However, some 
studies indicate that mood discounting may also take place dur-
ing mood priming, which favors the influence of related mood 
under high message elaboration. 
 
Effects of arousal on opinion formation 
Empirical findings. High arousal has generally been found to 
foster the development of extreme and polarized judgments 
(e.g., Giesen & Hendrick 1974; Gorn, Pham, & Sin 2001; Mano 
1992; Mintz & Mills 1971). Giesen and Hendrick (1974) in-
duced high and low arousal in participants who then heard a 
taped speech on the problems associated with the use of pesti-
cides. The results show that highly aroused individuals per-
ceived pesticides to be a bigger problem than did individuals in 
the low arousal condition. 
As with mood discounting, the discounting of arousal influ-
ences may occur when the individual recognizes the irrelevance 
of arousal (e.g., Sinclair et al. 1994; Zillmann, Johnson, & Day 
1974). Sinclair and colleagues (1994) manipulated both affect 
(i.e., valence), using a priming procedure, and arousal, by en-
gaging half of the participants in physical exercise and instruct-
ing the other half to sit for the same duration. Immediately after 
exercising or sitting, or after a 2-minute delay, participants com-
pleted measures concerning their emotional state. The individu-
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als who were more aroused reported more extreme prime-
consistent affect when the judgment was delayed. Participants 
who indicated their affective state after a delay misattributed 
their arousal to their affective state, whereas participants who 
indicated their affect immediately correctly attributed arousal to 
the exercise. Similarly, Zillmann and colleagues (1974) found 
that unrelated arousal increased aggressive behavior only when 
the arousal could not be correctly attributed to its cause. A cor-
rect attribution inhibited arousal effects on aggressive behavior. 
Not only can arousal influence judgments directly, arousal 
may also impact attitude extremity through the activation of 
polarized cognitive concepts. Stangor (1990) showed that 
aroused individuals interpreted information about a negatively 
depicted person as more negative than did non-aroused individ-
uals. In another experiment, aroused individuals produced more 
extreme positive traits to describe moderately positive celebri-
ties. Similarly, aroused individuals produced more highly nega-
tive traits in the evaluation of negative judgment objects. 
Arousal may also influence judgments by biasing the inter-
pretation of affective states. According to Clark and colleagues 
(1984), arousal activates memory content with a similar level of 
arousal which, in turn, influences the interpretation of affective 
states. For example, high arousal may prompt individuals to 
interpret a negative affective reaction as anger (a high arousal 
emotion), whereas low arousal promotes the interpretation of the 
same negative affective reaction as depression (a low arousal 
emotion). Clark and colleagues corroborated this result in two 
experiments. Taken together, the findings indicate that arousal 
promotes emotion-specific priming (cf. next section) by affect-
ing the interpretation of affective states. For example, during 
judgment formation, high arousal may promote a reliance on 
anger-related thoughts and low arousal may promote a reliance 
on depression-related thoughts. 
Further studies indicate that arousal influences not only atti-
tude extremity. Grabe and colleagues (2003) investigated the 
effects of arousing news content (i.e., related arousal) on the 
evaluation of the news. The results show arousing news stories, 
compared to non-arousing news stories, to be evaluated as being 
less informative and more interesting and the covered situation 
as being more threatening. Although attitude change was not 
directly assessed in these studies, the findings suggest that arous-
ing news content may be less persuasive because recipients re-
gard it as less reliable. Mano (1994) investigated the influence of 
arousal on risk-taking behavior. The results show that higher 
arousal led individuals to be less willing to pay for insurance to 
protect themselves from a potential loss but to be more willing 
to pay for gambles. However, high negative affect (i.e., unpleas-
antness and high arousal) prompted individuals to avoid risks 
and be more willing to pay for insurance. Therefore, arousal and 
valence may interact during decision-making. Strong positive 
affect indicates that a situation is highly benign, whereas strong 
negative affect signals danger. 
Mechanisms. As with the mood-as-information hypothesis 
(e.g., Schwarz 1990), the arousal-as-information hypothesis 
(Storbeck & Clore 2008; also cf. Schachter & Singer 1962) pos-
its that arousal informs judgment when the arousal is attributed 
to the object under consideration or to an emotional reaction 
toward the object. Hence, arousal may influence the perceived 
intensity of emotional reactions and the extremity of judgments. 
As with mood heuristics, the influence of arousal can be dis-
counted when its irrelevance to a judgment is recognized. How-
ever, in contrast to mood, arousal influences not the valence but 
the extremity of judgments by signaling importance or urgency. 
In other words, the arousal heuristic informs individuals as to 
how strongly they feel about something. Importantly, attitude 
importance and extremity have been found related in the context 
of various political issues (e.g., social welfare, military spend-
ing, and women’s rights) (Liu & Latané 1998). Thus, arousal 
may promote more extreme political attitudes by signaling to the 
individual that an issue is of high importance. 
Arousal has also been argued to influence attitude extremity 
through affective priming (Clark 1982; Clark, Milberg, & Erber 
1984; Stangor 1990). Clark (1982) and Stangor (1990) posited 
that arousal should prime extreme concepts within the associa-
tive network (i.e., concepts that are highly positive or negative). 
As with mood priming, arousal may activate affectively congru-
ent concepts. However, congruence in arousal priming refers not 
to the valence of concepts but rather to their extremity or im-
portance. The arousal-extremity model (cf. Hansen & Kry-
gowski 1994) suggests that arousal at the time of encoding 
should favor the retrieval of more extreme categories of infor-
mation from memory given that more extreme schemata tend to 
be associated with higher levels of emotions and arousal. 
Related versus unrelated arousal. The theoretical approach-
es of explaining attitudinal effects of arousal parallel the ap-
proaches in mood research. Specifically, arousal may be used as 
affective information during judgment formation or prime cogni-
tive content. Empirical corroboration stems primarily from stud-
ies in which unrelated arousal was induced by caffeine, music, 
or false feedback (e.g., Mintz & Mills 1971; Giesen & Hendrick 
1974; Gorn et al. 2001). Nevertheless, related arousal has also 
been demonstrated to impact political judgments (e.g., Grabe et 
al. 2003). More important, the excitation transfer hypothesis (cf. 
Zillmann 1991) states explicitly that unrelated and related 
arousals may add up and produce an overly intense reaction 
toward an object. Apparently, individuals have trouble discrimi-
nating between related and unrelated arousal. Still, individuals 
have been found to have the ability to recognize the irrelevance 
of unrelated arousal and discount its influence during judgment 
formation (Sinclair et al. 1994; Zillmann et al. 1974). As with 
mood discounting, the influence of unrelated arousal should be 
discounted more often than that of related arousal. Following 
research on mood effects, one would expect this discounting to 
take place when unrelated arousal is used as a judgment heuris-
tic and during arousal priming. In contrast, the relationship be-
tween related arousal and attitude extremity is expected to be 
more stable.  
 
Effects of discrete emotions on opinion formation 
Empirical findings. As discussed above, emotions exhibit 
unique patterns of appraisal and carry more information than 
moods, which mainly consist of their valence. Consequently, the 
influence of an emotion on the formation of political opinion 
comes not only from the valence but also each appraisal dimen-
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sion of the emotion. Emotion-specific effects on attitudes have 
been corroborated in multiple studies. One line of studies ad-
dresses the differential effects of anger and fear. Lerner, Gonza-
lez, Small, and Fischoff (2003) found that related fear about 
terrorism increased risk estimates and decreased support for 
vengeful policies. In contrast, anger decreased risk estimates and 
support for conciliatory policies while increasing support for 
vengeful policies. Similarly, Nabi (2003) demonstrated that re-
lated anger and fear about drunk driving influenced information 
seeking and attitudes. Angry individuals were more interested in 
retributive information and favored retributive policies. In con-
trast, fearful individuals preferred protective information and 
protective solutions. Similarly, fear has been shown to decrease 
support for war (Huddy et al. 2005; Schoen 2006) and enhance 
support for isolationism (Huddy et al. 2005). The findings indi-
cate that emotions are associated with a tendency to interpret 
information and act upon it. Fear leads individuals to assess 
situations as hazardous and motivates them to seek protection. 
Anger signals that a negative situation is controllable and moti-
vates the individual to punish the culprit. 
Further studies have investigated the differential effects of 
anger and sadness on attitudes. Anger has been associated with 
more causal attributions (Lerner, et al. 1998; Small, Lerner, & 
Fischoff 2006). Specifically, anger fosters the generation of 
thoughts concerning the causes of political events, where sad-
ness leads to a focus on the consequences of events. Further-
more, anger can promote a preference for punitive and retribu-
tive policies (Gault & Sabini 2000; Nerb & Spada 2001) and 
decrease support for social welfare (Small & Lerner 2008) and 
supportive policies (Nerb & Spada 2001). In contrast, sadness is 
generally associated with a preference for social welfare and 
supportive measures. 
Raghunathan and colleagues (Raghunathan & Pham 1999; 
Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman 2006) investigated the differen-
tial effects of anxiety and sadness. Compared to anxious indi-
viduals, sad individuals showed a higher preference for high-risk 
options. According to the authors, the induced emotions were 
associated with specific goals that influenced the participants’ 
judgments. Sad individuals were more likely to take a risk as 
their emotions motivated them to compensate for a loss, whereas 
anxious individuals, being motivated to avoid potential losses, 
chose more secure options. 
Some studies have investigated the way in which discrete 
emotions are triggered by news reports and subsequently influ-
ence political opinion. Nerb and Spada (2001; also cf. Nerb 
2000) presented participants in a series of experiments with 
short news reports about an environmental disaster. The authors 
manipulated the degree of responsibility that was attributed to 
the actor that caused the disaster in order to induce anger or 
sadness in the participants. The news report that induced anger 
promoted support for retributive action, whereas the news report 
that induced sadness promoted supportive action. Similarly, 
Kühne and Schemer (2011) found that an anger-framed news 
story about a traffic accident, compared to a sadness-framed 
news story, increased the preference for retributive policies and 
the behavioral intention to punish traffic offenders. Apparently, 
news frames may trigger discrete emotions that influence politi-
cal judgments. DeSteno and colleagues (2004) investigated the 
interaction of emotional states and news frames during the pro-
cess of judgment about a tax policy. The authors found that sad 
participants were more likely to be persuaded by a sadness-
framed message in favor of tax increases than neutral partici-
pants. Sad participants were also more likely to indicate that 
they would vote for the tax proposal. The findings imply that 
news reports can influence political judgments by triggering 
discrete emotions and that news frames become more persuasive 
when they appeal to the emotional state of the recipient. 
Mechanisms. Lerner and colleagues (Lerner & Keltner 2000; 
Han et al. 2007) have proposed a framework to explain the per-
suasive effects of discrete emotions on judgments. Their Ap-
praisal Tendency Framework (ATF) is based on appraisal theo-
ries and functional approaches to emotion and postulates that 
discrete emotions arise as a response to a specific evaluation of a 
situation. The induced emotional state exhibits a specific pattern 
of appraisal and is associated with the motivation to follow an 
adequate course of action. This first step is termed cognition-to-
emotion. In a second step, termed emotion-to-cognition, emo-
tions give rise to “an implicit cognitive predisposition to ap-
praise future events in line with the central appraisal patterns 
that characterize the emotions” (Han et al. 2007, p. 160). Emo-
tions entail cognitive evaluations that are projected onto subse-
quent judgments and motivate the individual to act accordingly 
(also cf. Raghunathan & Pham 1999). In other words, emotions 
increase the tendency to evaluate situations in an emotion-
congruent way and motivate the individual to act accordingly. A 
related proposition stems from DeSteno and colleagues (2004) 
who argue that discrete emotions influence likelihood judgments 
by signaling to individuals that emotion-congruent events are 
more likely. For instance, a fearful individual tends to perceive 
the world as dangerous and threatening events to be very likely. 
Given that emotions result from a combination of multiple 
appraisals, it follows that emotions may convey more complex 
information than moods or arousal, which mainly provide in-
formation about valence and importance, respectively. However, 
the cognitive complexity of emotions also reduces their sphere 
of influence. Specifically, the influence of an emotion is limited 
to the spheres of judgment related to the dimensions of apprais-
als associated with that emotion (Han et al. 2007). Any carryo-
ver requires a match between the main appraisal dimensions of 
the emotion and the salient cognitive dimensions of the judg-
ment.  
Related versus unrelated emotions. Emotion-specific effects 
on judgment have been investigated with regard to related and 
unrelated emotions. Related emotions have been induced by 
instructing individuals to think about emotional aspects of an 
issue (Lerner et al. 2003; Small et al. 2006) and by presenting 
emotional articles (Nerb & Spada 2001; Nerb 2000) or news-
casts (Meijnders et al. 2001). Unrelated emotions have been 
induced by instructing individuals to reproduce emotion-
inducing life events (Small & Lerner 2008) or by presenting 
emotional stories about an unrelated issue (DeSteno et al. 2004; 
Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards 1993). Emotion-specific effects 
on opinion formation have been demonstrated for both related 
and unrelated emotions. Theories such as the ATF propose that 
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related and unrelated emotions have the same effect on judgment 
(cf. Han et al. 2007). However, as with theories about mood 
effects, Lerner and Keltner (2000) argue that certain boundary 
conditions are required for such effects to arise. First, the goal 
attainment hypothesis suggests that appraisal tendencies will be 
deactivated when the emotion-related goal is attained. For ex-
ample, Goldberg, Lerner, and Tetlock (1999) found that anger 
promoted punitive judgments when the culprit of the anger-
inducing crime had not yet been punished. However, when the 
culprit had already been punished, anger no longer promoted 
more punitive judgments. Inducing unrelated emotions by in-
structing individuals to remember emotional life events may, 
thus, promote emotional reactions that are more likely to be 
discounted because the emotional goals associated with past 
events tend to be already attained. In contrast, emotional goals 
associated with related emotions (i.e., emotions related to the 
current issue) are likely to be still active during judgment for-
mation. 
Second, the cognitive awareness hypothesis asserts that ap-
praisal tendencies will be deactivated when individuals realize 
that their incidental emotions are irrelevant to the judgment (also 
cf. DeSteno et al. 2000). As with the mood discounting hypothe-
sis (Schwarz & Clore 1983), unrelated emotions should be dis-
counted when their irrelevance to a judgment is acknowledged, 
and related emotions are more likely than unrelated emotions to 
influence judgment processes. This notion has been corroborated 
by Lerner et al. (1998), who showed that holding individuals 
accountable for their judgments reduced the influence of unre-
lated anger on the punitive intensity of their judgments. When 
held accountable for their judgments, individuals were more 
motivated to generate valid judgments and corrected for the 
influence of unrelated anger. Similarly, DeSteno et al., (2000) 
found that individuals with high need for cognition corrected for 
influences of unrelated emotions on likelihood estimates, where-
as individuals with low need for cognition formed estimates that 
were consistent with their emotional state. 
All in all, the findings on the attitudinal effects of emotions 
on judgment parallel the effects of moods, that is, emotions gen-
erally promote assimilative judgment. In contrast to moods, 
however, emotions convey not only information about the va-
lence of an event but also multiple cognitive assessments, such 
as certainty or agency. Furthermore, emotional influences on 
judgment may have no attitudinal impact when the emotional 
goal has already been attained or the irrelevance of the emotion-
al state is acknowledged. 
 
The informational value of related and 
unrelated affects 
The reviewed studies and theories indicate that both unrelated 
and related affects may have a substantial impact on the for-
mation of political opinions. First, affect influences the way in 
which political information is processed. Happy mood, low and 
intense arousal, and emotions such as anger and disgust have 
been found to inhibit a detailed analysis of information and 
promote a reliance on preexisting preferences, judgment heuris-
tics and stereotypes. In contrast, negative mood, moderate 
arousal, and fear are associated with a careful, bottom-up analy-
sis of political messages, which enables individuals to assess the 
quality of arguments and generate counter-arguments. Second, 
moods, arousal, and emotions influence the nature of the politi-
cal attitudes formed. Happy mood has been shown to promote 
positive attitudes, whereas negative mood promotes negative 
attitudes. Similarly, discrete emotions give rise to emotion-
congruent judgments. Fear, for example, prompts the individual 
to perceive a situation as risky, whereas anger signals that a 
situation is under control. Arousal has been demonstrated to 
impact political judgment by influencing the extremity of judg-
ments. More precisely, the extremity of the affective state carries 
over to the political attitude being formed. 
The findings indicate that affect has mainly assimilative ef-
fects on political judgments: Individuals typically perceive their 
affective state as a reaction to current mental content and, in 
turn, act according to the implications of their affective state. 
According to the mood-as-information approach (e.g., Schwarz 
1990), assimilative effects result from the informational value 
that affective states convey to the individual: Affect serve as 
rapid indicators of the way in which messages should be pro-
cessed or provides information about the nature of political ob-
jects. By conveying information rapidly, affect facilitates a quick 
adaptation to the demands of the environment. The reviewed 
mechanisms of affective influence suggest that affect typically 
conveys information through two different processes. On the 
one hand, individuals may directly rely on their feelings when 
forming political judgments. On the other hand, affect may 
prime affect-congruent cognition. In other words, affect may 
also promote adaptation by influencing the cognitive concepts 
used during judgment formation. 
Depending on the structure of the particular affective state, 
different information may be conveyed to the individual. Both 
mood and arousal have limited cognitive content and can be 
reduced to experienced valence and activation, respectively. 
Mood provides information about the positive or negative va-
lence of things, whereas arousal provides information about 
importance. In contrast, emotions arise from specific configura-
tions of cognitive appraisals. Emotions hence carry more infor-
mation than moods or arousal and exhibit a cognitive specificity. 
At the same time, the cognitive structure of emotions reduces 
their sphere of influence. First, individuals are usually aware of 
the cause of an emotion and are, therefore, less likely to 
misattribute emotions compared to moods and arousal. Second, 
emotions may only color judgment if there is a fit between the 
cognitive structure of the emotion and that of the judgment. In 
other words, the carryover necessitates a match between the 
main appraisal dimensions of the emotion and the salient cogni-
tive dimensions of the judgment. 
Considering the informational value of affect, empirical 
findings and the theoretical models both suggest that related and 
unrelated affects should have a similar impact on judgment for-
mation because they do not differ with regard to their experien-
tial quality. Additionally, related and unrelated affects are as-
sumed to operate through the same processes. However, there 
exists one major difference between related and unrelated af-
fects: Unrelated affect can be discounted more easily than relat-
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ed affect. Individuals typically link their current affect (whether 
related or unrelated) automatically and implicitly to the currently 
experienced mental content without reflecting on the plausibility 
of such an attribution. This feature allows affect to facilitate 
rapid adaptations to current environmental demands. However, 
given ample cognitive resources and motivation, individuals 
may reconsider this implicit association and notice the true rele-
vance of the affective state to the respective judgment. Conse-
quently, during judgment formation, unrelated affect, which is 
not intrinsically linked to the judgment, should be discounted 
(i.e., lose its informational value) more often than related affect. 
Similarly, the validity of a cognitive assessment primed by unre-
lated affect should be doubted more regularly. In other words, 
affect, like cognitive information, may be used as a basis for 
judgments but may also be regarded as incorrect or useless for a 
specific judgment. This pattern appears to apply for moods, 
arousal, and emotions. Hence, returning to the question of 
whether affective influences are determined by the experiential 
quality or the cause of affect, it appears that the subjective expe-
rience of affect is the more decisive determinant of affective 
influences, whereas one’s awareness about the causes of an af-
fective state may moderate the influence. 
The reviewed approaches that consider affect discounting 
(Schwarz 1990; Storbeck & Clore 2008; Lerner & Keltner 2000) 
suggest that the assimilative effects of related and unrelated 
affects are the default procedure and that affect discounting re-
quires additional cognitive processing and reflection. Thus, af-
fect should influence political judgments regardless of its relat-
edness when individuals have limited processing resources (i.e., 
low motivation and/or ability). However, affective relatedness 
should become more important with the increase in processing 
resources. Mood research has also demonstrated that correction 
processes are often imprecise. Apparently, individuals have trou-
ble in determining the influence of affect on their judgment. 
Hence, when affective influences are detected, individuals tend 
to overcorrect them, which results in incongruent outcomes. 
It should be noted that the present discussion has focused 
mainly on the differential attitudinal influences of related and 
unrelated affects. However, the same arguments should apply 
also to the processing effects of affect. Specifically, to the extent 
that individuals do not question the relevance of their affective 
state, affect may guide information processing. However, when 
individuals realize the irrelevance of their affect, they may 
choose to abandon the processing style prompted by the affect. 
All in all, the reviewed studies indicate that emotion is an 
important factor influencing political judgment. Individuals do 
not rely only on cognitive information (i.e., acquired knowledge 
and beliefs) but also on their affective reactions when making 
decisions about political issues. The corpus of empirical findings 
and theories about affective influences substantiates the notion 
that the classical rational choice paradigm has a one-sided view 
on political decision-making (cf. Marcus, Neumann, & MacK-
uen 2000). In particular, citizens do not exclusively base their 
decisions on arguments or the cognitive computation of the ex-
pectancy values of different options. 
This review emphasizes the processes underlying affective 
influences on judgment. To date, there exist multiple theoretical 
approaches that address these processes. However, further re-
search is necessary to gain a better understanding about the in-
terplay of higher cognition and affect. A clear understanding of 
the underlying processes is crucial and will increase the predic-
tive power of models that treat political decision-making as a 
mainly cognitive process. Furthermore, knowledge about these 
processes is necessary for a normative assessment of affective 
influences. Traditionally, it has been assumed that political rea-
soning should be protected from affective influences (cf. Marcus 
2000). However, current findings indicate that affect is not al-
ways detrimental to reasoning but may even enhance rational 
decision-making (e.g., Damasio 1994; Blanchette & Richards 
2010; Marcus et al. 2000). A better understanding of cognitive 
and affective decision-making will, hence, support more in-
formed judgment about the desirability of affective influences. 
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